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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules.
Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social
peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest that whether individuals use such social information
for strategy updating may be crucial to the outcomes of social interactions. This hints at the
importance of considering updating rules without dependence on social peers’ payoff information,
which, however, is rarely investigated. Here, we study aspiration-based self-evaluation rules, with
which individuals self-assess the performance of strategies by comparing own payoffs with an imag-
inary value they aspire, called the aspiration level. We explore the fate of strategies on population
structures represented by graphs or networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the
condition for strategy dominance, which is found to coincide with the classical condition of risk-
dominance. This condition holds for all networks and all distributions of aspiration levels, and for
individualized ways of self-evaluation. Our condition can be intuitively interpreted: one strategy
prevails over the other if the strategy brings more satisfaction to individuals than the other does.
Our work thus sheds light on the intrinsic difference between evolutionary dynamics induced by
aspiration-based and imitation-based rules.
∗ Corresponding author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Past decades have seen intensive investigations of evolutionary games in structured pop-
ulations [1–5]. One of the most important questions is how population structure alters
evolutionary outcomes. It is shown that this strongly depends on updating rules [3, 6–8].
Update rules are explicit behavioral rules of individuals, which specify what kind of informa-
tion they use and how they process such information to determine future behaviors [3]. In
evolutionary games, the information required by updating rules usually includes individuals’
strategies and payoffs. As the input for decision making, the information used is likely to
affect individuals’ behavioral updating, resulting in changes at the population level. Indeed,
recent human behavioral experiments suggest that whether individuals use social peers’ pay-
off information to update behavior may be crucial to the outcome of social interactions, for
example, the level of cooperation in groups [9, 10] or on network-structured populations
[11–14].
Based on the relevance of social peers’ payoffs, updating rules in theoretical models can be
classified into two classes: imitation-based (require) and self-evaluation based (not require).
Under imitation-based rules, individuals update strategies by copying strategies of the more
successful peers. When using self-evaluation based rules, individuals self-assess performance
of strategies and then switch to strategy alternatives [3]. Self-evaluation can be based on
aspiration: individuals compare achieved payoffs with their endogenous aspirations and then
switch based on the shortfall of payoffs [15–17]. Updating rules of these two classes are both
common in practice and they are tailored for different environment. For example, if individ-
uals are not confident to make decisions or uncertain about the consequences, imitating the
more successful provides valuable shortcuts for decision-makers. Self-evaluation, instead, is
efficient and superior when social information is unavailable, regarded as unreliable, or costs
individuals too much to gather and process. Albeit their prevalence, most studies in struc-
tured populations focus on imitation-based rules [1–8, 18–21], whereas self-evaluation based
rules receive much less attention [22–26]. Since evolutionary outcomes are highly sensitive
to updating rules, a lack of sufficient investigation in self-evaluation based rules may prevent
us from better understanding how population structure affects the fate of strategies.
Indeed, theoretical studies find that self-evaluation based rules lead to intrinsically differ-
ent evolutionary outcomes from imitation-based ones [22, 23, 25, 26]. One of such differences
is the effect of population structure on the fate of strategies: under aspiration-based self-
evaluation rules, the fate of strategies on regular and random graphs is found to be the
same as that in well-mixed populations [26], whereas imitation-based rules lead to outcomes
sensitive to population structures and other model details [7, 8].
As yet, it remains unclear how evolutionary games under aspiration-based self-evaluation
rules (for short, aspiration dynamics) affects the fate of strategies on general population
structures. Here, we consider aspiration dynamics on any graphs or networks. Under the
limit of weak selection, we analytically derive a condition for one strategy to prevail over
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the other, which is found to coincide with the classical condition of risk-dominance. This
condition holds for every network and every distribution of aspiration levels, and for in-
dividualized ways of self-evaluation. If aspirations are differentiated by strategies, we find
that the condition of risk-dominance is altered and cooperation can evolve in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game if defectors aspire more than cooperators. The intuitive interpretation of
our results is as follows: one strategy prevails over the other if the strategy brings more
satisfaction to individuals than the other does. Our work reveals that switching off from the
payoff information of social peers when updating strategies has a nontrivial impact on the
evolutionary outcomes.
II. MODEL
We consider a population with fixed size N (N ≥ 2). The population structure is depicted
by a static weighted graph with edge weights wij, where vertices represent individuals and
edges indicate who interacts with whom. Self-interactions are excluded. Individuals collect
edge-weighted average payoffs by playing games with their nearest neighbors [21]. The total
number of interactions each individual i engages in is di =
∑N
j=1wij (i = 1, 2, · · · , N).
We require di > 0 for all i, which means that each individual at least has one neighbor
to interact with. Visually, the graph should have neither isolated vertices nor self-loops,
which are natural assumptions when studying evolutionary games on graphs. In each game,
individuals can play either strategy A or strategy B. The payoff matrix of the game is given
by
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
, (1)
where both players get payoff a if they play strategy A (A-player) and get d if they play
strategy B (B-player); if an A-player encounters a B-player, the former obtains payoff d
and the latter c. For each individual i, we denote pii,X as its payoff when it uses strategy X
(X = A,B).
At each time step, an individual is randomly selected and given the opportunity to revise
its strategy. We assume individuals follow self-evaluation based rules, under which they
evaluate their strategies by comparing the realized payoffs with their endogenous aspirations.
Aspirations are either personalized [27], which means each individual l has its own aspiration
αl (l = 1, 2, · · · , N), or contingent on strategies, which means that individuals using strategy
A have an aspiration αA and those using B have αB. For the sake of simplicity, we consider
fixed aspirations, which means there is no adaptation of aspirations due to learning. If
such aspiration-driven updating rules is deterministic, the aspiration level serves as a sharp
boundary between satisfaction and disappointment [28]: if an individual’s payoff exceeds its
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FIG. 1. Aspiration dynamics on weighted graphs. Upper left panel: An undirected weighted
graph with edge weight wij . Upper right panel: Individuals occupy vertices of the graph and
each individual l has an imaginary payoff value αl they aspire, called aspiration level. Lower
panel: For aspiration dynamics, at each time step, an individual is randomly selected (marked
by black circle). It garners edge-weighted average payoffs (pi6) by playing games with its nearest
neighbors [21]. Then it self-evaluates the performance of the strategy in use by calculating the
payoff-aspiration difference (pi6 − α6). If the payoff exceeds the aspiration, it feels satisfied and is
more likely to keep its current strategy; otherwise, it is prone to switch. As illustrated, pi6−α6 < 0
and the corresponding individual switches from strategy B to A.
aspiration, the outcome is deemed as satisfactory and it will repeat its strategy; if the payoff
is otherwise lower than the aspiration, it feels disappointed and will switch to the other
strategy. In real-life situations, strategy updating involves mistakes and admits bounded
rationality, which allows individuals to switch strategies probabilistically (stochastically).
The probability can be determined by the level of satisfaction, i.e., the difference between
the achieved payoff and aspiration level. In our model, we use updating functions [27, 29] to
map the payoff-aspiration difference into the switching probability. We allow individuals to
have their own updating functions since they may behave differently even for the same level
of satisfaction. Albeit this flexibility, all updating functions should ensure that individuals
have decreasing tendency to switch a strategy if it brings more satisfaction.
Here, we employ stochastic self-evaluation based rules. Under stochastic rules, the strict-
ness of the strategy evaluation, namely, how much the payoff-aspiration difference affects
individuals’ decision-making, is controlled by the selection intensity β ≥ 0 [30, 31]. The re-
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sulting aspiration dynamics admit a stationary distribution, which is similar to the mutation-
selection process [7, 32]. In this distribution, we compare the average abundance (i.e., fre-
quency) of strategy A, 〈xA〉, with that of B, 〈xB〉. If 〈xA〉 > 〈xB〉, strategy A prevails over
(dominates) B. Otherwise, B prevails over A. We derive the conditions for strategy domi-
nance, i.e., the conditions which lead to 〈xA〉 > 〈xB〉 or 〈xB〉 > 〈xA〉. To make progress, we
consider weak selection (i.e., 0 < β  1) [21, 30, 31, 33, 34], under which individuals switch
strategies with a nearly constant probability. Weak selection may arise for the following
reasons: (i) individuals may be insensitive to the payoff-aspiration difference; (ii) payoffs for
different strategies are close; (iii) individuals are confused about the payoffs as they update
strategies [34].
III. RESULTS
Let us first consider personalized aspirations. Given our assumptions, we calculate the
average frequency difference between strategy A and B, 〈xA−xB〉, in the stationary regime.
If 〈xA − xB〉 > 0, strategy A prevails over B; otherwise, strategy B prevails over A. Under
weak selection, we find that strategy A prevails over B if a+b > c+d, and strategy B prevails
over A if a + b < c + d. This result holds for all weighted graphs without self-loops, for all
distributions of aspirations, and for arbitrary number of updating functions. Furthermore,
if strategy A and B are both best replies to themselves (i.e., a > c and b < d), our result
reduces to the classical concept of risk-dominance. It indicates that under the limit of weak
selection, aspiration dynamics always select the risk-dominant strategy, which has a larger
basin of attraction.
Our work extends previous studies [25–27] in the following important directions: (i) non-
regular and weighted graphs can be considered; (ii) individualized updating functions can be
incorporated. Our result also generalizes previous findings: (i) the selection of risk-dominant
strategy on regular graphs [26] is generalized to non-regular and weighted graphs, arbitrary
number of updating functions, and personalized aspirations. (ii) the coefficients σ0 and σ1 in
the condition for strategy dominance in [27] are shown to be equal and they can be rescaled
to one by dividing a positive term, which leads to the condition of risk-dominance.
For an intuitive understanding of our result, we offer the following explanations. Under
weak selection, the expected payoffs of playing strategy A and B are evaluated at the
neutral (β = 0) stationary distribution of the aspiration dynamics (see SI for details). In
this distribution, individuals update strategies independently, which makes their strategies
uncorrelated. Individual l thus on average interacts with neighbors using strategy A as many
times as those using B. This means that the expected payoffs of l are pil,A = (1/2)(a+b) and
pil,B = (1/2)(c+ d) when it plays strategy A and B, respectively. If pil,A > pil,B, individual l
is more satisfied when it uses strategy A and the switching rate from A to B is less than that
from B to A. Note that pil,A > pil,B is equivalent to a+ b > c+ d. Therefore, individual l is
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FIG. 2. Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions on weighted graphs. For the game, we set
payoff value b = 0, c = 5, d = 1 and leave a as a tunable parameter. We plot the average frequency
of strategy A, 〈xA〉, as a function of a. Symbols represent simulation results while solid lines are
analytical ones. We construct weighted graphs by first generating an undirected graph with average
degree k¯ and then assigning weights to edges. The undirected graphs considered are random graph
(left), regular graph (middle), and scale-free network (right). For each type of network, we test three
edge weight distributions: homogeneous—every edge has weight one (i.e., unweighted network);
uniform—edge weights are uniformly selected from the integer set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}; power-
law—edge weights are randomly selected from the discrete power-law distribution (Zipf distribution
with the exponent s = 3). Each data point is obtained by averaging 〈xA〉 in 200 independent runs.
For each run, we calculate 〈xA〉 by averaging the frequency of strategy A in the last 1× 107 time
steps after a transient time of 1 × 107 time steps. Other parameters: N = 1000, k¯ = 6, αl = 2.0
(l = 1, 2, · · · , N), and β = 0.01.
more likely to be an A-player if a+b > c+d. Since the above logic applies to any individual,
the condition a+ b > c+ d actually makes all the individuals feel more satisfied when they
play strategy A. As a consequence, the average frequency of A-players in the population is
greater than that of B-players. Similarly, a + b < c + d results in more satisfaction when
individuals play strategy B, which makes the average frequency of A-players less than that
of B-players.
Comparing our result with that in well-mixed populations (equivalent to a complete
graph in our model) [26], we show that population structure does not alter the condition for
strategy dominance. In other words, the condition for strategy dominance under aspiration
dynamics is robust to the underlying population structure. The robustness property has
practical advantages on strategy selection [7]: (i) for a fixed game, the predictions are the
same for a large class of population structures; (ii) to tell the fate of strategies, the population
can be assume to be well-mixed.
Besides, by generalizing the Theorem in [27] to non-regular graphs, our result is related
to the structure coefficient σ [4, 7] derived for weak selection. It is shown that σ depends
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on the updating rule and the population structure (including the population size N). But
it does not depend on the payoff entries. It summarizes the effect of population structure
on the condition for strategy dominance. For aspiration dynamics, we prove that σ = 1 for
a large class of population structures and there is no dependence on the population size.
This contrasts with the result obtained under imitation-based rules, which are shown to
sensitively depend on the population structure and the population size [7, 21]. In addition,
σ = 1 indicates that self-evaluation based rules does not lead to assortment of strategies for
the purpose of strategy selection. Therefore, evolutionary outcomes under self-evaluation
based rules are intrinsically different from those under imitation-based rules.
When individuals’ aspirations are contingent on their strategy in use (and thereby asym-
metric), we find that the condition for strategy A to be favored over B under weak selection
is a + b > c + d − 2 (αB − αA), where αX is the aspiration of X-players (X = A,B). Note
that the condition now depends on aspirations. Nonetheless, it is still robust to population
structures, which generates invariant predictions for a large class of population structures.
Intuitively, the symmetry breaking of aspiration levels leads to additional asymmetry be-
tween strategy A and B: A-players not only gain a different payoff but also have a different
benchmark for satisfaction from B-players. The expected level of satisfaction is now modi-
fied as (1/2)(a+b)−αA and (1/2)(c+d)−αB for A-players and B-players, respectively. This
modification alters the condition of risk-dominance derived under personalized aspirations
and results in the dependence on aspiration levels.
So far, we only consider average payoffs. Our framework also applies to accumulated
payoffs (see SI for the conditions for strategy dominance). We show that the condition of
risk-dominance is invariant under accumulated payoffs, provided that aspirations are not
contingent on strategies and the selection intensity is sufficiently weak.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we present a general framework to study aspiration dynamics in structured
populations represented by graphs or networks. We show that under weak selection, the
condition for one strategy to be selected over the other is invariant on different population
structures. Moreover, this condition coincides with the condition of risk-dominance. It indi-
cates that aspiration dynamics always select the risk-dominant strategy. When individuals’
aspirations are contingent on strategies and thus asymmetric, the condition for strategy
dominance is altered and determined by the difference between the aspirations of distinct
strategies. In this case, cooperators can prevail over defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma if
defectors aspire more than cooperators.
In addition to the irrelevance of social information, self-evaluation based updating rules
have other features different from imitation-based rules: self-evaluation based rules are inno-
vative [3], which means they can revive strategies absent in the neighborhood without addi-
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tional mechanisms such as random exploration or mutation; they increase their tendency to
cooperate when more cooperators are present in the neighborhood (similar to conditional co-
operators [35]) in Prisoner’s Dilemma. These features seem to be consistent with the recent
findings on the possible features of human strategy updating [11–14]. This suggests that
self-evaluation based rules may be a good candidate for human strategy updating, which
needs further empirical test.
Aspiration-based self-evaluation rules are also related to reinforcement learning. The
rationale behind reinforcement learning is the law of effect stated by Thorndike in 1898:
actions bringing satisfactory effect will be more likely to be repeated and those leading to
discomfort will be less likely to occur. This is similar to our stochastic updating rules,
except the reinforcement of actions [36, 37]. In practice, aspiration can evolve itself based
on past experience [17]. Although these features are not incorporated into our models, our
work provides a first step towards evolutionary games in structured populations, whereas
literature on reinforcement learning usually focuses on the simplest two-person repeated
interactions (see a few recent exceptions on regular graphs [38, 39]). Extending our model
to incorporate aspiration adaptation and reinforcement of actions is a future direction.
For the effect of population structure on the fate of strategies, we show that aspiration
dynamics generate quite different predictions from imitation-based ones. When and how
humans use one rule instead of another are yet to be explored. A promising direction is to
conduct experiments explicitly manipulating the information availability or monitoring the
information request during the game [10, 40]. Then, based on the distinct informational
requirements of self-evaluation based and imitation-based rules, we may infer under what
conditions human subjects tend to use these two classes of updating rules. For theoretical
studies, our work reveals a class of updating rules which generate invariant predictions for
strategy dominance on a large class of population structures. The reason may lie in the
irrelevance of social peers’ payoffs for strategy updating. It remains unclear which other
assumptions in updating rules affect the predictions on strategy dominance and what the
most important ones are. Future work along this line may lead to a deeper understanding
about how updating rules alter the evolutionary outcomes, which may help to cultivate the
optimal decision-making heuristics for the evolution of human cooperation.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (SI)
I. MODEL AND NOTATION
A. Population structure
The population size is N and the structure of the population is depicted by an undirected
weighted graph with edge weights wij. This graph is fixed during the whole evolution process.
Here, wij > 0 denotes the weight of edge ij while wij = 0 means there is no connection
between node i and j. Since edges are undirected, wij = wji. Moreover, we define the
weighted degree of node i as di =
∑N
j=1wij [21].
B. Discrete-time Markov chain with finite states
In our model, individuals can play one of the two strategies, strategy A and strategy
B. We consider the stochastic aspiration dynamics in structured populations. The state
of the system can be described by a (column) binary vector s = (s1, s2, · · · , sl, · · · , sN)T
where s(l) = sl is the strategy of individual l: sl = 1 if individual l uses strategy A, sl = 0
if it uses B. We model the resulting evolutionary process as a discrete-time Markov chain
{Sn, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · · } with state space {s1, s2, · · · , sM} where M = 2N . For each individual
l, its strategy at the k-th step is thus Sk(l). Note that throughout this SI text, all the vectors
are column vectors by default.
C. Payoff
On the weighted graph, nodes are occupied by individuals and links indicate who interacts
with whom. Individuals interact with their nearest neighbors according to the game given
by the following payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
, (2)
and they collect the degree-weighted average payoff pi. Here, self-interactions are excluded
and each individual must have at least one neighbor to interact with, which requires that
wll = 0 and dl > 0 for all l.
For each individual l, the number of times it interacts with an A-player at state s is∑N
k=1wlksk and that with a B-player is
∑N
k=1wlk(1− sk). The payoff of individual l at state
11
s is thus
pil(s) =
N∑
k=1
wlk
dl
[aslsk + bsl(1− sk) + c(1− sl)sk + d(1− sl)(1− sk)] (3)
D. Aspiration-based updating functions
In the real world, different individuals may make distinct decisions for the same shortfall
of payoffs, which means they may have individualized ways of self-evaluation. Such het-
erogeneity can be characterized by different updating functions [27]. We define individual
l’s updating function as gl(u) (l = 1, 2, · · · , N) and these functions represent the tendency
to switch strategies. For aspiration-based updating functions, u = β(αl − pil), where αl is
individual l’s aspiration level, pil its payoff, and β > 0 is the intensity of selection [21, 30].
Weak selection means β  1 and β = 0 is the neutral drift [7]. In addition, each function
gl(u) should satisfy the following restrictions:
• it is a probability, i.e., gl(u) ∈ [0, 1] for u ∈ (−∞,+∞);
• it is a strictly increasing function of u, i.e., g′l(u) = dgl(u)/du > 0 for all u, which
indicates that individuals with higher payoffs should have a lower tendency to switch;
• gl(0) > 0, which avoids frozen dynamics at the neutral drift.
E. Transitions under aspiration dynamics
Under aspiration dynamics, individuals’ self-assessment of strategies triggers the transi-
tion between states. At each time step, only one individual can update its strategy, either
switch to the other strategy or keep the current strategy unchanged. For the former, it
means that the one-step transition between two distinct states of the associated Markov
chain happens only if they possess the same entries everywhere except at one place which
marks the strategy switching of the selected individual. Formally, this means that the one-
step transition between si and sj (i 6= j) is possible only if
∑
l |si(l) − sj(l)| = 1. Here,
the operator | · | means to take the absolute value. For convenience, we denote the set of
states which can transit out of (or into) si as Ni (si /∈ Ni), namely, the neighboring states
of si. If the selected individual instead does not switch, the state of the Markov chain stays
unchanged. Therefore, the transition probabilities of the Markov chain are
pij =

1
N
glij(β(αlij − pilij(si))), if j ∈ Ni,
1−∑k∈Ni 1N glik(β(αlik − pilik(si))), if i = j,
0, otherwise,
(4)
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where lij (lik) is the selected individual and it is uniquely determined by si and sj (sk).
A simple way to locate lij is by looking at the (unique) non-zero entry of vector sj − si
when sj ∈ Ni. With all these transition probabilities, we have a transition matrix P whose
(i, j)-th entry is pij, which describes the one-step transition probability between any states.
II. CONDITION FOR STRATEGY SUCCESS
A. General condition
Let us denote the number of individuals playing strategy A at state s as φ(s) =
∑N
l=1 sl.
The abundance (frequency) of strategy A and B at state s is xA = φ(s)/N and xB =
1 − xA, respectively. The frequencies of strategy A at all states are denoted as a vector
x = (φ(s1)
N
, φ(s2)
N
, · · · , φ(sM−1)
N
, φ(sM )
N
)T and those of B are 1 − x where 1 is a vector with all
its elements being one. Under aspiration dynamics, transition is possible between all the
states (not necessarily in one step) and the number of steps taken can be odd or even. This
indicates that aspiration dynamics admit a unique stationary distribution u, in which each
state occurs with a positive probability [41] and all these probabilities sum up to one, i.e.,
uT1 = 1. The stationary distribution u can be obtained by solving a set of linear equations
uTP = uT. In this stationary distribution, we calculate the average abundance of strategy
A as 〈xA〉 = uTx and that of B as 〈xB〉 = uT(1 − x) = 1 − 〈xA〉, where the angle bracket
〈·〉 means to take the average over all the states.
Strategy A is more abundant than strategy B if and only if 〈xA〉 > 12 [7, 42]. Since
〈xA〉 + 〈xB〉 = 〈xA + xB〉 = 1, the condition 〈xA〉 > 12 is equivalent to 〈xA〉 > 〈xB〉 [4, 8],
and further equivalent to 〈xA − xB〉 = uT(2x − 1) > 0. Note that u and P depend on the
selection intensity β and so do 〈xA〉 and 〈xB〉. To show this dependence, we rewrite them as
uβ, Pβ, 〈xA〉β, and 〈xB〉β. In the limit of weak selection β → 0, we do a Talyor expansion
of 〈xA − xB〉β with respect to β at β = 0 and get
〈xA − xB〉β = 〈xA − xB〉0 + 〈xA − xB〉′0β +O(β2), (5)
where 〈xA − xB〉′0 is the first-order derivative of 〈xA − xB〉β with respect to β, evaluated at
β = 0 and O(β2) is the higher order terms of β2, which is negligible as β → 0. Note that the
first term in the right-hand side of (5) is the average abundance difference between strategy
A and B at the neutral drift, which is zero [27]. Since β > 0, the condition for strategy A
to be more abundant than B becomes
〈xA − xB〉′0 = (u′0)T(2x− 1) > 0. (6)
To get u′0, we differentiate u
T
βPβ = u
T
β with respect to β and evaluate it at β = 0, by
rearranging items, we obtain
(u′0)
T(I−P0) = uT0P′0, (7)
13
where I is the identity matrix of dimension M , u′0 =
d
dβ
uβ|β=0, and P′0 = ddβPβ|β=0. Note
that I − P0 is not invertible since it is not full rank. Introduce the matrix W = 1uT0 , we
know that the matrix I−P0 + W is invertible and its inverse, denoted as Z0, is called the
fundamental matrix [41]. As shown in ref. [41], Z0 = (I−P0 +W)−1 =
∑∞
k=0(P0−W)k =
I +
∑∞
k=1(P
k
0 −W) and (I − P0)Z0 = I −W. Note that (u′0)TW = 0T, right multiply Z0
at both sides of equation (7), we have
(u′0)
T = uT0P
′
0Z0. (8)
Substituting equation (8) into (6), we have that strategy A is favored over strategy B if
〈xA − xB〉′0 = uT0P′0Z0(2x− 1) = uT0P′0
(
I +
∞∑
k=1
(Pk0 −W)
)
(2x− 1) = uT0P′0c > 0, (9)
where c =
∑∞
k=0P
k
0(2x−1) = (c1, c2, · · · , ci, · · · , cM)T. In detail, ci =
∑∞
k=0
∑M
j=1 p
(k)
ij (
2φ(sj)
N
−
1) where p
(k)
ij is the (i, j)-th entry of P
k
0. Remind that p
(k)
ij is the k-step transition probability
from state si to sj. Summing over all the possible states,
∑M
j=1 p
(k)
ij (
2φ(sj)
N
− 1) is the average
abundance difference between strategy A and B at the k-th step when starting at state si.
Therefore, ci is the accumulated average abundance difference during the whole evolution
when the initial state is si.
Actually, equation (9) holds for any evolutionary dynamics which have a unique limiting
stationary distribution and an equal abundance of strategy A and B at the neutral drift.
For example, the death-birth, birth-death process and pairwise comparison with symmetric
mutations are of this class [7, 8, 19–21, 43].
B. The condition for aspiration dynamics
1. Calculating the average accumulated abundance difference
Remind that ci =
∑∞
k=0
∑M
j=1 p
(k)
ij (
2φ(sj)
N
−1) where p(k)ij is the k-step transition probability
from state i to j at the neutral drift (i.e., β = 0). It represents the accumulated average
abundance difference during the whole evolution when starting at state si. Note that the
summation over all the transition steps and that over all the states are interchangeable,
we have ci =
∑M
j=1
∑∞
k=0 p
(k)
ij (
2φ(sj)
N
− 1) and and it is the average accumulated abundance
difference between strategy A and B during the whole evolution.
Under aspiration dynamics, when β = 0, the payoffs collected from the games do not affect
individuals’ strategy revisions. More importantly, during the whole evolution, individuals’
strategy revisions are completely independent of each other. Due to this independence, we
can study the much simpler two-state Markov chains for each individual instead of dealing
with the whole chain with 2N states. For the two-state Markov chain of individual l, the
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state space is {0, 1} and the associated transition matrix is
( 1 0
1 1− 1
N
gl(0)
1
N
gl(0)
0 1
N
gl(0) 1− 1N gl(0)
)
. (10)
The associated k-step transition probabilities are
Prob (Sk(l) = 0|S0(l) = 0) = Prob(Sk(l) = 1|S0(l) = 1) = 1
2
[
1 + (1− 2
N
gl(0))
k
]
,
Prob(Sk(l) = 1|S0(l) = 0) = Prob(Sk(l) = 0|S0(l) = 1) = 1
2
[
1− (1− 2
N
gl(0))
k
]
.
Since each individual’s behavior is highly independent of each other, we can calculate
their contribution to the average accumulated abundance difference separately. Starting at
state si, at step k, the contribution of individual l to the abundance difference is(
2si(l)
N
− 1
N
)
Prob(Sk(l) = si(l)|S0(l) = si(l)) +
(
1
N
− 2si(l)
N
)
Prob(Sk(l) = 1− si(l)|S0(l) = si(l))
=
2si(l)− 1
2N
[
1 + (1− 2
N
gl(0))
k
]
+
1− 2si(l)
2N
[
1− (1− 2
N
gl(0))
k
]
=
2si(l)− 1
N
(
1− 2
N
gl(0)
)k
.
By definition of the updating functions, 0 < gl(0) < 1 for all l. The contribution of individual
l to the accumulated abundance difference during the whole evolution is thus
∞∑
k=0
2si(l)− 1
N
(
1− 2
N
gl(0)
)k
=
2si(l)− 1
N
N
2gl(0)
=
2si(l)− 1
2gl(0)
.
Summing up all the individual contributions, we obtain the average accumulated abundance
difference of the whole Markov chain as
ci =
N∑
l=1
2si(l)− 1
2gl(0)
(11)
By this formula, we obtain that c only depends on the updating functions. It does not
depend on the game, the aspiration levels, and the population structure.
2. Deriving the exact formula
Denote h(si) =
∑M
j=1 p
′
ijcj, which is the i-th row of P
′
0c. Equation (9) implies that the
condition for strategy A to be favored over B is
〈xA − xB〉′0 = 〈h(s)〉0 > 0, (12)
where the bracket 〈·〉0 means to take the average over the neural stationary distribution (i.e.,
when β = 0).
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Substitute formula (11) of cj into h(si), we have
h(si) =
M∑
j=1
p′ijcj =
M∑
j 6=i
p′ij(cj − ci) =
M∑
j 6=i
p′ij
N∑
m=1
sj(m)− si(m)
gm(0)
. (13)
Note that the transitions can happen if si and sj (i 6= j) differ at only one individual’s
strategy. Combining with the transition probability (4), we have that for j 6= i,
p′ij
N∑
m=1
sj(m)− si(m)
gm(0)
=
 1N
g′lij (0)
glij (0)
(αlij − pilij(si)) (1− 2si(lij)) , if j ∈ Ni,
0, otherwise.
where g′lij(u) = dglij(u)/du (see Section I D). The summation over all neighboring states can
also be rewritten as the summation over all the individuals, which leads to
h(si) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
(αl − pil(si)) (1− 2si(l)) .
Here, we drop the subscript lij since the summation goes over all the individuals.
Substituting the payoff formula (3) into the above equation and using s2l = sl, we obtain
that for any state s,
h(s) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
{
(1− 2sl)αl +
N∑
k=1
wlk
dl
[aslsk + bsl(1− sk)− c(1− sl)sk − d(1− sl)(1− sk)]
}
.
(14)
Evaluating 〈h(s)〉0 needs to analyze the correlation of strategies in the neutral stationary
distribution. Under aspiration dynamics, when the selection intensity β = 0 (neutral drift),
individuals’ strategy updating does not dependent on the aspiration level, the payoff, and
the population structure. The transition probabilities between any two states are thus
the same in both directions, which indicates that the transition matrix is symmetric, i.e.,
P0 = P
T
0 . By the uniqueness of the stationary distribution u0 and the property of the
transition (stochastic) matrix P01 = 1, we have 1
TP0 = 1
T, which leads to u0 = 2
−N1
through normalization. This results in that at the neutral stationary distribution, each
individual plays strategy A with probability one-half, i.e., 〈sl〉0 = 1/2 for all l. Moreover,
since individuals’ strategy updating is independent of each other, 〈slsk〉0 = 〈sl〉0〈sk〉0 = 1/4
when l 6= k. Based on these, we have that the correlation of strategies at the neutral
stationary distribution
〈slsk〉0 = 1 + δlk
4
, (15)
where δlk = 0 if l 6= k and δlk = 1 if l = k. Equation (15) indicates that aspiration dynamics
do not lead to assortment of strategies in the neutral stationary distribution.
Combining Equations (12), (15), and (14), we obtain that
〈xA − xB〉′0 =
1
4N
(
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
)
(a+ b− c− d). (16)
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Since gl(0) > 0, g
′
l(0) > 0 by definition, strategy A outcompetes B in abundance if a + b >
c+ d and strategy B outcompete A if a+ b < c+ d.
Moreover, the average abundance of strategy A in the stationary distribution can be
obtained by combining equation (16) and the identity 〈xA + xB〉β = 1, which leads to
〈xA〉β = 1
2
+
1
8N
(
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
)
(a+ b− c− d)β +O(β2).
C. Asymmetric aspirations
For aspirations contingent on the strategy in use, individuals playing strategy A have
aspiration level αA while those using B have αB. As shown in Section II B 1, coefficients c
in Equation (9) is evaluated at β = 0. The asymmetry of aspirations thus does not affect
c. However, h(s) in Section II B 2 now depends on both αA and αB, and Equation (14) is
modified as
h(s) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
{
(1− sl)αB − slαA +
N∑
k=1
wlk
dl
[aslsk + bsl(1− sk)− c(1− sl)sk − d(1− sl)(1− sk)]
}
.
(17)
Note that at the neutral stationary distribution, strategy correlations 〈slsk〉0 are independent
of aspirations. Combining Equations (12), (15), and (17), we obtain that
〈xA − xB〉′0 =
1
4N
(
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
)
(a+ b− c− d+ 2αB − 2αA). (18)
Therefore, under the limit of weak selection, the condition for strategy A to prevail over B
for asymmetric aspirations is
a+ b > c+ d− 2(αB − αA),
and that for B to prevail A is a+ b < c+ d− 2(αB − αA).
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (i.e., a < c and b < d), a+b is always less than c+d. If the
aspirations are symmetric, strategy A is never favored since a+ b < c+d. With asymmetric
aspirations, if αB − αA is large enough, it is possible that a + b > c + d − 2(αB − αA),
which selects strategy A over B. Considering the evolution of cooperation, this means that
cooperators can prevail over defectors if defectors aspire more than cooperators.
D. Accumulated payoffs
Under accumulated payoffs, the payoff of individual l at state s is
pil(s) =
N∑
k=1
wlk [aslsk + bsl(1− sk) + c(1− sl)sk + d(1− sl)(1− sk)] . (19)
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This leads to that
h(s) =
1
N
N∑
l=1
g′l(0)
gl(0)
{
(1− 2sl)αl +
N∑
k=1
wlk [aslsk + bsl(1− sk)− c(1− sl)sk − d(1− sl)(1− sk)]
}
.
Since the way of payoff collection does not affect the correlation of strategies in the neutral
stationary distribution, we obtain that
〈xA − xB〉′0 =
1
4N
(
N∑
l=1
dl
g′l(0)
gl(0)
)
(a+ b− c− d) (20)
and the condition for strategy A to be favored over B is a+ b > c+ d and that for strategy
B to be favored over A is a+ b < c+d. This means that accumulated payoffs do not change
the condition for strategy dominance under aspiration dynamics.
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